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. BRINGING RISK-MANAGEMENT FOR THE FORE:
EPISTEMOLOGY AS THEORY OF INQUIRY
My approach to the ethics of belief from a focus on responsible risk
management, where doxastic responsibility is understood in terms of the
degree of the riskiness of agents’ doxastic strategies, which is, in turn,
most objectively measured through accordance or violation of inductive
norms. With respect to beliefs, a person’s rights and obligations, use
deontological language, or virtues and vices, to use virtue theoretic language,
are attributable to agents on the basis of how epistemically risky was the
process or strategies of inquiry salient in the etiology of their belief or in
the strategies by which they maintain or revise a belief already held.
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From what norms does the ethics of belief derive its virtues and vices,
its permissions and censure? Since pragmatists understand epistemology
as the theory of inquiry, the paper will try to explain what the aims and
tasks are for the ethics of belief, or project of guidance, which best fits
with this understanding of epistemology. And it will try to support it
with the work of William James and several contemporary pragmatists.
Making the “doxastic strategies” of individual and collective agents central
to the project of epistemic assessment results in a significantly different
account than either the standard epistemological externalists focus on
“processes” in the objectively reliable etiology of belief, or than the standard
evidentialist focus on an agent’s reflectively available “reasons” which lend
the agent a certain kind of rationality, and subjective justification for
her belief. This alternative would seem to require a more robust social
epistemology than externalism or internalism, since strategies are valued
as intelligent responses to problems for inquiry, and so focuses on agents’
actual, intersubjective practices in pursuit of epistemic ends of true belief,
knowledge, and understanding. While that would be far too large a project
for the present occasion, we can at least try to explain how these two kinds
of normativity, the projects of present assessment (the state or propositional
attitude has toward a target proposition, and the standing of that attitude
as warranted or meeting conditions for knowledge, etc.) and forward-looking
guidance (praise and censure, improvement, etc.), are related.
This paper will continue the development of the claims that an ethics of
belief for the present age, and for the future, needs to be risk-aware. It will
develop the claim that the defense of permissivism is mightily improved
by incorporating a principled account of the limits of responsible faith
ventures. But it will develop especially the further claim that these limits
come into view when we attend to the doxastic strategies which agents
employ, and to agents’ sensitivity or lack of sensitivity to the inductive
risk they incur. This will show that the right to remain “steadfast” as the
polar opposite of the equal-weight view is described as, is not the upshot
of risk-aware permissivism, either. The defense of an agent’s intellectual
right to a blanket steadfast response seems to be what phenomenological
conservativism, like religious apologetics, aims for: a situation where the
higher-order evidences of peer disagreement and even of bias-mirroring in
the acquisitions of my beliefs, can be safely set aside and thereafter ignored.
Attention to inductive risk, I hope to show, challenges this policy as well.
The next two sections discuss psychological work on narrative aspects
of personal identity. Section  discusses how doxastic risk-taking is often
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involved in the formation of identity. It finds much of this normal and
healthy, but also motivates the need for risk-aware social epistemology,
and therefore a permissivism able to offer a principled account of the
limits of responsible faith ventures. Section  reviews and further develops
my earlier argument (Axtell, ) that the evidentialist ethics of belief
as articulated by Feldman and Conee has weak roots and sour fruits. It
buttresses these claims by harnessing the work of Susanna Rinard and
others on how pragmatic factors can serve as reasons for belief, and how
we should understand the relationship between trait-dependent factors in
the etiology of a belief— factors such as pragmatic reasons, temperament,
emotion and affect— and epistemic normativity. Following this general
ground clearing to make way for a more inquiry-focused foundation for
the ethics of belief, sections – hone in on inductive risk, the risk of
“getting it wrong” in an inductive context of inquiry. They describe some
of the specific, empirically-informed markers / measures of inductive risk,
and how they answer to our concern to determine limits to a person’s
reasonableness in their doxastic ventures.
. IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE EMBRACE OF RISK
The value of identity construction might function as a defense of an
opportunistic approach to risk-taking. This view recognizes that the value of
doxastic risk-taking for the individual is bound up with self-experimentation,
autonomy, personal identity, and group identity. For the project of epistemic
assessment (and the “project of analysis”), epistemic risk and epistemic
luck are closely connected. But moral risk, which the broader literature on
inductive risk in policymaking directly involves, is not so nearly synonymous
with moral luck. What this means for my approach is that while it makes
the doxastic strategies of individual and collective agents central to the
projects both of epistemic assessment and of guidance, it does not make
guidance mirror or follow from assessment nearly as closely as it does
for these other approaches. Some agents’ beliefs or attitudes towards
disagreeing may deserve censure for their riskiness, but especially in domains
of controversial views, riskiness is not properly measured by the evidentialist
notion of synchronic evidential fit, but rather by objective reliability or
ability according to inductive norms. So, if indeed we want to make a fresh
start we should avoid reducing the primarily diachronic norms that inform
the ethics of belief from to the primarily synchronic norms that evidentialism
touts; we must also avoid reducing guidance to staying in or returning to
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synchronic rationality: S having no attitude towards a target proposition p,
or just that attitude or level of credence “supported by S evidence at time t”.
We should take note of two basic perspectives of risk, both one-sided, so
ill-fit to rule alone. The one characterizes risk as an irresponsible choice; the
other as an opportunity to be seized. The William Clifford—William James
debate reflects this contrast to some degree, so one place to look for it is this
classic debate over the merits of the evidentialist principle, and over which
domains of discourse, all, none, or some, this principle should be conceded
as being normative for. Clifford asserted a social-moral duty to honestly
“earn” one’s right to their beliefs and / or credence, by pursuing rather than
avoiding inquiry and evidence, and in attending to inquiry and evidence, by
never believing anything more firmly than their present evidence logically
supports. This principle exhibits a risk-averse attitude towards the beliefs
and / or credences / acceptances to which one acquiesces: it sees doxastic
irresponsibility as risk-taking, and as potential moral harm to others besides
oneself who might be affected by it, and it makes no exceptions for domains
where the censure is not equally fitting. James countered William Clifford’s
moral evidentialism primarily by contrasting. He countered it with a private
right of each individual to be a “chooser of their own risk”, at least with
respect to their faith ventures or those worldview beliefs he described as
fulfilling the conditions of a “genuine option”. It is true that “No man is an
island”, but it is equally true that humans neither do nor to be reasonable
always ought to “Wait for the bell” of logically sufficient evidence on all
matters of philosophical or religious metaphysics that matter to them.
James conceded to Clifford that by and large we humans need caution in
our doxastic strategies more than we need “courage”. The council of courage
he concedes leads to much credulity, and it would be question-begging to
treat “chooser of their own risk” (italics added) as undercutting the impact
of our beliefs upon others, which was basic to how Clifford motivates moral
evidentialist argument. In his famous early paper “The Will to Believe”
which answers Clifford directly, James tried to properly circumscribe the
Lockean-Humean norm of proportioning one’s beliefs to the evidence one
has for it, by an exception case for choices that meet conditions of a “genuine
option”. But this take of excusing conditions does not speak to dogmatism
and fanaticism and the conflict and intolerance they breed, which were,
of course, a shared concern of Locke, Hume, and Clifford. For this reason
Jame’ early way of circumscribing this right to be chooser (or manager) of
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risk through appeal to genuine options as exception cases, has not proved
very convincing.
In subsequent works, James does address credulity and intolerance, and
in one of his last writing, “Faith and the Right to Believe”, James wrote
much more directly that faith “must remain a practical and not a dogmatic
attitude. It must go with toleration of other faiths, with the search for
the most probable, and with the full consciousness of responsibilities and
risks” (James, : ). This essay is still a robust defense of fideistic faith
ventures and a criticism of both skeptical and religious evidentialism. But
it offers a more agent-centered way of framing responsibilities, and a more
balanced conception of personal intellectual right and “that spirit of inner
freedom” with personal virtue and responsibility. Recent work on social us /
them biases and on how we sometimes commit epistemic injustices towards
others through the attitudes and beliefs we hold towards or about them
only accentuates the need for such a properly qualified or circumscribed
permissivist ethics of belief. Now more than ever we can see how agents
are not always in the best position to judge their own rationality.
So, James’ psychological insights and his ethics of belief provide good
resources for the development of permissivism in regard to religious and
philosophical “over-beliefs”. In recent papers and in Problems of Religious
Luck: Assessing the Limits of Reasonable Religious Disagreement (Axtell,
). I have tried to develop the resources in James for a robust permis-
sivism, and for a Dialogue model of science and religion, in contrast to
Independence and Conflict models that portray science and religion either
as complete strangers, or as enemies Permissivism recognizes that the
sources of persistent diversity over what John Rawls () referred to
a comprehensive conception of the good, are plentiful and often unavoidable.
They include symbolic aspects of cultural identity, conditions of robust
See Henry Jackman commutativityfor an argument that the exception case approach is
inconsistent with and less strong than the more naturalized role with pragmatist philosophers
ascribe to prudential reasoning within our cognitive economy (Jackman, ).
I thank an anonymous Referee for suggesting clarification of the first draft’s thesis, and
several further, more specific suggestions which I try to incorporate below. See Axtell, 
for an explication of James’ Dialogue model, and how it supports permissivism and “friendly”
theist / atheist, etc. relations in contrast to polarized relations. At the outset of “Reflex Action
and Theism” James proposes that “Among all the healthy symptoms that characterize this
age, I know no sounder one than the eagerness which theologians show to assimilate results of
science”. Interestingly, Nottelmann & Fessenbecker,  seem to interpret Clifford as a critic
of the Independence model, or at least Arnold’s version of it which describes religious language
as morality touched with emotion.
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evidential ambiguity, the role of temperament, will, values and practical
reasons, and the need for inference to the best explanation (the holistic
nature of the evidence for worldviews and ideologies), what the other
“burdens of judgment”. But I have also aimed for what I call risk-aware
permissivism, or “permissivism with teeth”, to contrasts its account of
the epistemology of disagreement with that of toothless dogmatism or
phenomenal conservativism. Recent work on social us / them biases and
on how we sometimes commit epistemic injustices towards others through
the attitudes and beliefs we hold towards or about them, only accentuates
how proper caution and intellectual humility itself takes courage. The
concern with hermeneutical and testimonial injustice does not come to an
end because one’s attitudes or beliefs are claimed to have a religious or
theological or scriptural sanction. The study of epistemic injustice must
pierce the veil of insulation from criticism for beliefs which “mirror” known
social biases, or show other markers of high inductive risk. If epistemic
injustices can be committed by people taking attitudes that are sexist or
racist, then it stands to reason that epistemic injustices can be committed
by people taking attitudes that are theologically absolutist or who engage
in polarized and polemical religious apologetics.
James famously held that a person’s “over-beliefs” guiding their practical
judgments are the most interesting thing about a person, and that they
embody the risks of different experiments of living. Jamesian meliorists
might heartily agree with psychologists like Cynthia Lightfoot: “Risks are
actively sought for their capacity to challenge, excite, and transform oneself
and one’s relationships with others. In this regard, risks are speculative,
experimental, and oriented toward some uncertain and wished-for future”
(Lightfoot, : ,). Psychological studies, especially those that no-
tice the narrative dimensions of identity construction, support shared
risk-taking as often promoting social bonding, and other healthy aspects
of development. Kierkegaard could not agree more: “Without risk there
is no faith”, Kierkegaard insists: “To venture causes anxiety, but not to
venture is to lose one’s self […] The most common form of despair is not
being who you are”.
I find it highly instructive that Rawl’ holism agrees both with James and with theologians
like Basil Mitchell, but that in explaining when disagreement can be reasonable, evidentialists
largely ignore holistic evaluation along with temperament’s influence.
With more reference to James, Jennifer Welchman also writes in defense of an “ethics of
self-experimentation” (Welchman, )
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The two basic attitudes towards risk-taking, as irresponsible choice and
as seizing the opportunity, are more obvious when speaking of actions than
of beliefs. But they do have application in regard to theoretical as well
as practical judgment, which we can best see if we don’t get too stuck
on the concept of “belief”, but consider it as standing in for a broader
range of propositional attitudes or affirmations, especially in domains of
controversial view: politics, religion, morals, and philosophy. Theologians
who want to justify religions-specific “knowing” by faith, or to reduce faith to
assent to a creed, and skeptical evidentialists like Feldman and Conee who
endorse the “triad”model which reduces propositional attitudes to belief,
disbelief, or suspension, each find a reason to reduce disagreement to dispute
about belief. In both the religious and the skeptical case, disagreement now
implies falsehood and the irrationality of someone (someone not me!). But
epistemic assessment is not always about the standings (warranted, justified,
etc.) of propositional attitudes assumed to be beliefs. The states themselves
are attributed by assessors according to criteria, not just by what that agent
or assessor wants to comfortably treat them as. An agent’s mental state
may exhibit tensions that suggest a self-deception on the part of the agent,
or a sub-doxastic rather than doxastic state, or it may require refraining
from ascribing or denying belief. If we recognize that our professed beliefs
may be out of accord with our actions, or that there is a gulf between
occurrent judgment and dispositional belief, then the attributional practices
of epistemologists need to be sensitive to belief-behavior mismatches and
to match in other ways their epistemology to the phenomena.
Philosophers and social scientists have different kinds of interest in the
concepts of risk. It seems to have an abundance of descriptive, explanatory,
and normative roles to play in philosophy and science. For example, the
riskiness of practical judgment, such as the decision to x, may be part of an
attempt to objectively describe that judgment within the context in which
agents individually or collectively make that decision. Riskiness now seen as
an objective feature of an environment or domain, or as a characteristic of
a choice to be made or a decision already made, might then also play a role
in the explanation. The riskiness of a choice may be salient in explaining
why the agent made it, or how she came to it. For instance, in Rebel Without
a Cause, Jim (the James Dean character) and another young man decide
to play chicken by racing their two cars to the sea cliff’s edge. That “You’ve
got to do something” is about all the explicit motivation it is given, but
See Schwitzgebel, , Leeuwen,  for discussion.
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the riskiness of the action and the social context of male rivalry and female
admirers, pride, and boredom seem all to be salient to its explanation. Risk
tolerance and pride are certainly among factors one might site why these
boys raced while others didn’t, and for why Jim roles out of his car to save
his life, rather than simply breaking while there was still time. His rival’s
misjudging of risk is of course also salient in his subsequent death.
Now it is vitally important to properly distinguish descriptive or psy-
chological questions from normative ones. For example, especially with
beliefs in domains of controversial views—moral, philosophical, political—
we recognize “conviction” and “certitude” as terms that may be descriptive
of a person’s psychological state, and we distinguish such convictions from
“certainty” as a normative concept in the epistemic sense of drawing upon
norms of evidence and inference, i. e. , the certainty of a proof in mathemat-
ics, or of an observable event in the world for which we have abundant and
incontrovertible evidence. Risk and luck, closely connected concepts, play
important roles in epistemic assessment. The norms of epistemic assessment
address such things as whether an agent has grounds for her belief, and
whether the reasons she has are the actual reasons for which she believes.
They address problems of luckily true belief, and preclude beliefs that
are only luckily true, in one or another sense of malign epistemic luck,
from qualifying as instances of knowledge. They address problems that
an agent’s justification, or the etiology of her belief, is not “connected”
in a normatively appropriate way, with the truth of that belief. Safety
and ability conditions on knowing, for example, are some of the ways
epistemologists have sought to expunge beliefs acquired in a lucky or risky
way, from counting as instances of knowledge. Epistemic luck is for these
reasons a prime topic in the project of analysis of knowledge. Risk is less
often the invoked term, but is here taken as closely overlapping.
. WEAK ROOTS AND SOUR FRUITS, REVISITED
In a chapter of Trent Dougherty’s collection Evidentialism and its Discon-
tents (Evidentialism and its Discontents, ), focusing on Feldman and
Conee’s articulation of evidentialism, I argued that their ethics of belief has
“weak roots and sour fruits”. The weak roots involve the defense of RUT,
the Rational Uniqueness Thesis, and what domains it might be normative
for. Thomas Kelly has argued, I think persuasively, that those who appeal
to the principle in discussing the epistemological significance of disagree-
ment frequently equivocate between a stronger and weaker claim, between
two kinds of epistemic “slack”, interpersonal and intrapersonal. Sliding
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from the more moderate intrapersonal to the interpersonal gives RUT the
appearance of being normative over peer disagreement. The stronger thesis
needs to be made for evidentialism to enjoy the tight connection that they
see between synchronic rationality and all-things-considered-guidance. But
among Kelly’s arguments for this is his construal of what is correct in the
Jamesian view that belief does not have a single aim, truth, but rather
a more pluralistic axiology where acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false
ones are different epistemic values that potentially come apart. My own
argument also focused on the inadequacy of the epistemic value monism
or Feldman and Conee. I focused on their most explicit argument, where
evidentialism as an ethics of belief is represented by this thesis (Conee
& Feldman, : , ).
O2 An agent ought to always have just exactly that attitude towards a proposition
supported by his / her evidence at that particular moment.
The support for O2 which they offer in their “Ethics of Belief” article
and others is:
V3 Being synchronically rational at every moment is uniformly what it is to
constitute epistemic success and to maximize epistemic value.
Certainly an ethics of belief should issue guidance that isn’t just for an
ideal-qua-atemporal agent; there is a place for more and less ideal-agent
norms, but should not treat the actual agent in such an idealized way
that the agent’s ecological rationality is ignored in the way I take it to
be in his influential evidentialist account. I think of an ethics of belief
as all-things-considered guidance, but that is because I do not divide the
diachronic and the pragmatic off from epistemology in the way that evi-
dentialists do. So, discussing the relationship between epistemic assessment
and guidance, as we are doing now, is an appropriate topic for us. To
summarize the argument of Axtell (Axtell, ), V3 is false, and so does
not support O2. That is aimed to undercut the tight connection of RUT to
the ethics of belief that obscures the centrality of diachronic norms. This
criticism of the centrality of synchronic rationality to the ethics of belief
applies whether one accepts their “Triad view” that there are only the three
Sometimes contingency or variability arguments are described as arguments from eviden-
tially irrelevant causes of belief, or simply as debunking arguments, on assumption that they
threaten to explain the etiology of these beliefs in a way that has nothing to do with their
likelihood of being true. I doubt this approach, since I doubt the rational-social dichotomy on
which it is based.
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propositional attitudes of belief, disbelief, or suspension, or whether one
understood “attitude towards a proposition” in terms of credence and de-
grees of assent. In the same volume Keith DeRose challenges O2 with cases
he presents as counter-examples, including this case: Henry has evidence
e, and e supports p, and he believes p based on e. But if he had inquired
responsibly, he would have had c that supports not-p.
Why does the sense in which Henry ought to believe p counts as epistemic,
while the sense in which Henry ought not to believe p, does not? I argued
that V3 is false by the epistemic value monism that it presupposes, and
looking back at this argument I think that De Rose’s, Kelly’s and my own
argument support each other’s rejection of the evidentialist’s reduction of
epistemic obligation to synchronic evidential rationality. We have discussed
the close connection between taking an externalist turn in epistemology
and allowing those diachronic considerations are epistemically relevant,
rather than necessarily pragmatic-moral, as they are for the evidentialist.
How can they not be when the etiology of belief is itself a diachronic affair?
To look at reliable or unreliable etiology is the same time to look back
on a process or strategy that culminates over time in the actual agent’s
coming to hold a belief. In withholding epistemic status to diachronic
concerns, evidentialists are only signaling that they have no way to integrate
internalism and externalism. But this is due to inadequacies of their own
approach.
But I also argued that synchronic rationality, as the focus of the as-
sessment of the status of beliefs among internalist evidentialists, misses
the externalist turn in epistemology and confuses its own project with
the project of analysis. Really the evidentialist concern synchronic fit is
a concern with a theory of rationality a kind of rationality that supplies
personal, but not directly epistemic justification. There is a confounding
of what are really two projects, and only on the basis of this conflation
do Feldman and Connie evidentialism as an epistemological theory in the
This extends to Jason Baehr’s article in the same collection, which also concerns the
responsibility of the agent-inquirer, and the exclusion on it from epistemic relevance on the
Feldman and Conee’s account (Baehr, ). On criticism of O, thanks to Kraig Martin for
sending me his  conference paper, “Can Epistemic Obligation be reduced to Synchronic
Evidential Justification?” Trent Dougherty’s exchanges with Martin and myself focus on this
question, and on the claim that diachronic considerations are always moral-pragmatic and
not epistemic. I call that one of the “dogmas” of internalist evidentialism, the other being
that the ethics of belief issues guidance of the same synchronic sort. Pragmatists reject the
rational-social dichotomy that informs this view, but through that rejection, the rational
intelligibility of epistemic norms is actually greatly improved.
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first place. Propositional and doxastic justification might be understood
in different ways, but the externalist turn is a turn towards the reliable
etiology of belief, and. So evidentialism has weak roots in this stronger sense
as well, that the ex-ante approach that it takes by focusing on abstract
propositions that might be held, rather than actually held beliefs and the
processes or strategies that gave rise to them, makes their approach far
less central to epistemic assessment than they have taken it to be.
. AGAINST THE FACTS: DENYING PRAGMATIC FACTORS
AS REASONS FOR BELIEF
Some evidentialists argue that if permissivism about evidence in any
domain is possible, then non-evidential believing must be possible, yet it
is not. Susanna Rinard and Miriam McCormick are contemporary prag-
matists who argue that this modus tollens argument is unsound (Rinard,
a, McCormick, ). I agree with Rinard that people can believe
for pragmatic reasons and that this assumption is crucial for properly
distinguishing between and relating norms for guidance-giving and for
epistemic assessment. Conscious non-evidential believing is not impossible;
it happens all the time. I do not see how this is can be denied when (as
I argue, every religious conception of faith has a fideistic minimum, and the
more fideistic, the more that non-evidential belief is prescribed, and taken as
paradigmatic of genuine religious faith. There are paradoxes in what I call
“prescribed certitude” and of course in believing something as historical
on a non-historical basis, but the impact of fideism needs acknowledging.
But it is a difficult argument that faith-based belief is philosophically
incoherent. Pragmatists want faith venturers and religious philosophers
to acknowledge epistemic risk, not philosophers to treat self-consciously
risky believing as impossible. Contrasting the evidentialist principle with
the more pragmatism-friendly one, Rinard argues the norm of action /
practical reasoning and of assertion having a relevantly similar structure,
and so an “equal treatment” that acknowledges this resolves issues about the
See Pritchard on the contours of a “two project” response to internalist evidentialism, and
Richards Foley’s various papers critiquing the “Unfortunate Assumption” as one well-argued
support of separating analysis of knowledge and the internalist theory of justified belief. The
problems for RUT and for evidentialism as a theory of knowledge are worse when the further
distinction between instrumentalist and intrinsicalist defenses of evidentialism are added to
discussion. Conee & Feldman,  and others seem committed to an evidentialist principle
being “truth’s own ethics” but this intrinsicalist argument is again a hard one to make, and
like Meylan,  I do not think they make it.
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relationship between ethics and epistemology, in ethics of belief. “Insofar as
we have control over these beliefs (be it direct or indirect), Equal Treatment
acknowledges the moral dimension as highly relevant to the question of
what we should believe” (Rinard, ).This is not in tension with but
supports an approach to normativity which builds off of her call for a more
careful distinction between the “guidance-giving” and the “epistemic” senses
of “should”. Rinard shows that “Evidentialism about the guidance-giving”
should is incompatible with Equal Treatments. She also develops ad-
vantages that Equal Treatment has over evidentialist alternatives, and
develops an account on which non-evidential considerations sometimes
serve as reasons for which one believes.
Still another suggestion to counter tunnel-vision on synchronic evidential
rationality would be to distinguish among epistemology’s first, second, and
third-personal tasks, and then to use these distinctions to help us more
carefully explain the relation between epistemic assessment (the project of
analysis of normative standings of knowing, justification, etc.) and guidance
(what the agent all things considered ought to do or not do in their inquiry
when the standing of a belief is substandard, or when their belief about
others may entail an epistemic injustice). What thus becomes clear is that
the ethics of belief has less to do with the third and first personal norms
that epistemic assessment or analysis of knowing draws upon, but much
more to do with second-personal normativity.
Second personal normativity, largely ignored in the ex-ante approach
where an individual agent, a proposition, and evidence bearing on that
proposition are basically all that matter, becomes more relevant when we
instead take an ex-post approach where actual belief, and then explore
See also Gerken, ; McCormick, ; Rinard, a,b. I would argue that Susan
Haack’s “Overlap Model” (Haack, ) elaborating the best way to conceive the relationship
between moral and epistemic factors in the ethics of belief is similar to Rinard’s, and a good
approach for the kind of risk-aware permissivism I develop.
“But,” she still asks, “what about evidentialism about the epistemic should— or, for that
matter, other theses about the epistemic should?” (Rinard, ).
“Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative
reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. I propose a new strategy
for the pragmatist [response to evidentialism]. This involves conceding that belief in the
absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can … play a role in bringing
about belief without being a motivating reason for belief, thereby leaving room for practical
considerations to serve as motivating reasons. These arguments push the debate between the
evidentialist and the pragmatist into new territory. It is no longer enough for an evidentialist
to insist that belief is impossible without evidence” (ibid.)
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its safe or unsafe etiology. Second personal normativity as it is discussed
in metaethics concerns the intersubjective, rather than the subjective or
the objective. It concerns the demands we make upon one another, how
these demands get motivated, and how they are negotiated. These include
demands for reasons-responsiveness, and people’s commitment to abide by
assertability conditions appropriate to the type of claim they make. On
my proposed picture, epistemic assessment is a matter of meeting certain
third-personal constraints on the riskiness of their belief-forming cognitive
strategy, and certain first-personal constraints as well. One first-personal
constraint that most epistemologists would agree must be met for knowledge
possession is the agent consciously “basing” of her belief on the good reasons
that she has available to her. This is the internalist demand that an agent
who knows that x does not just “have” sufficiently good epistemic reasons
for some target proposition x, but that the agent’s belief is based on
those reasons. Recently, this has been articulated as a demand to preclude
another malign form of epistemic luck, what Bondy and Pritchard term
propositional epistemic luck (Bondy & Pritchard, ).
We have seen that following Feldman and Conee’s V3 to their O2 conflates
the ethics of belief with what the evidentialist takes as epistemic assessment,
pragmatism and virtue epistemology do not have this problem. This of
See also Pritchard, . I take an initial foray into the impact of propositional religious
luck on religious epistemics. If I believe that x and have sufficient reasons supporting x but
base my belief not on them but for some reasons or out of some other irrelevant causal factors,
what I believe, even though true, will not qualify as an instance of knowing. I will be deluded
about my actual reasons for belief, or aware of them but not of their rational insufficiency to
ground my belief. So, there seems to be a special connection between believing for pragmatic
reasons and propositional luck I hope to explore in future papers, a connection especially
problematic where agents convince themselves post hoc of the logical sufficiency of their
evidences. The third-personal constraints on knowledge are seen in different ways, but basically
refer us to an externalist condition (typically an aretaic and / or a modal safety condition),
aimed at assuring the reliable etiology of the agent’s belief. Staying with the language of
epistemic luck, knowledge requires that the etiology of one’s belief is not an etiology impacted
by malign epistemic luck, as we find for instance, in Gettier cases: this externalist kind of
malign luck is termed veritic luck in the literature. There is nothing new in the foregoing,
which might just be taken as simply describing a “mixed” analysis of knowledge that has both
an Internalist (doxastic justification condition or anti-propositional luck condition) and an
externalist condition (a condition to preclude Gettierization). But perhaps it opens us up to
see that epistemic assessment has little to do with second-personal constraints, while agent
rationality and the ethics of belief draw far more heavily from it than they do from the first
or third personal concerns. Axtell (Axtell, ), chapter  treats propositional religious luck
as one of the six types in my taxonomy, and suggests why its recognition might have strong
implications for religious epistemics.
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course is why they not only have stronger epistemological roots but also
better practical fruits: why they are able to as evidentialists are not to
defend the possibility of reasonable disagreements, and to support Rawlsian
reasonable pluralism.
What about modified versions of evidential such as Scott Akin and
Robert Talisse, or the principled agnosticism that J. Adam Carter argues
for? The evidentialists who accept the obvious fact that we acquire our
evidences chronologically, seem driven to “split the difference” with each
new disagreeing agent one comes across. But this is a criticism of the
literature on the equal weight view though and the evidentialism that
motivates it, not on Aikin or Feldman specifically. They have themselves
been critical of the equal weight view, at least on my reading it’s not at
all clear what positive alternative they offer, consistent with their view
that the evidentialist principle should be normative over the ethics of
belief. One who rejects equal weight seems driven to the normativity of
a commutativity of evidence principle, a principle which tells us that each
piece is to be weighed equally, was given its proper due, irrespective of
Interestingly, Aiken and Talisse have made an excellent critique of the equal weight view,
leading to absurdities. The problem is that it’s not clear in their work what other alternatives
there are consistent with their belief in the evidentialist principle as being normative over the
ethics of belief. The alternative to recognizing the naturally heavier emphasis one puts on first—
acquired evidence, is to accept an evidentialism rooted in something like the commutativity
principle. I am sure this ideal agent principle has its uses in decision theory, but to have it be
a source of blame I would argue again asks too much for the kind of doxastic responsibility that
virtue requires. Even if one accepts commutativity as guiding evidential fit for the purposes
of epistemic assessment, what comes out as fitting is whether an agent “should” believe to
be synchronically rational will depend on further assumptions the attributor makes unless
evidence is all of just the same kind. This clouds the picture for the reason that it brings
us back to the need for holistic valuation, and not by the agent, but by the attributor of
knowledge as well. But that holistic reasoning, the need for which arises for inquirers especially
under conditions of local or chronic underdetermination, will necessarily bring temperament
and legitimate practical interests back into the picture. And this is what, to protect the
purity of epistemology, most evidentialists seem unwilling to abide. This is why often say
that the issues of pragmatic encroachment are somewhat misstated. Often the deeper issue is
diachronic encroachment on to an artificial purity where only synchronic evidential rationality
is properly epistemic. But does Rawlsian religious pluralism accept “lawful and interminable
inconsistenc”, as the moral evidentialist Scott Aikin thinks is true of permissivist ethics of
belief more generally? For discussion of this argument and response, see Axtell, .
Aiken (Aikin, ), Feldman and Conee seem to advocate the intrinsical in contrast
to the instrumentalist account of the evidentialist principle’s normativity. See Anne Meylan
(Meylan, ) for an argument that the view that believing in accordance with one’s evidence
is intrinsically right is untenable.
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the actual agent’s actual earlier or later acquisition of those pieces. This
I argue raises a different but equally absurdly high bar for reasonableness.
Finally, reasonable pluralism thought of as supported by this “diachronic
turn” in the ethics of belief, may well be consistent with something like
a Peircean eschatological convergence of views. The latter view is not
obviously inconsistent with a rejection of the Uniqueness Thesis. If this
is correct, there needs to be nothing lawful or interminable about the
kind of inconsistency pragmatism permits and accounts for. An initially
robustly ambiguous evidential situation can also change in positive ways,
reducing the underdetermination of our conflicting beliefs, and favoring
one or the other of them, or some other previously un-envisioned belief
instead of either. So, the “interminable” charge doesn’t seem correct of
the “lawful” (reasonable) disagreement which permissivism defends. And
although the intellectualism of evidentialist internalism tries to cut off the
influences of individual temperament and social milieu over our worldview
beliefs, treating these as non-rational influences that might just be cast
aside by agent’s modeled as evidentialism models them, this seems mis-
guided also. Due to our intellectual engagements with one another our
temperaments themselves might also moderate, leading to convergence
down the road will.
Much has been written between synchronically-focused “equal-weight”
and “dogmatic” responses to peer disagreement. Carter’s controversial view
agnosticism offers many improvements to the debate. Primarily, it recog-
nizes as most evidentialists do not, the need to an epistemology of domains
of controversial views apart from every day or straightforwardly empirical
beliefs. While I admire his many valid criticisms of Feldman’s assumptions,
the normative upshot for J. Adam Carter in his “On Behalf of Controversial
View Agnosticism” his controversial view agnosticism, is still a form of
impermissivism. But principled agnosticism is equally as given to RUT and
to a synchronic conception of guidance as is the “equal-weight” view. The
“liveability” of either sort of guidance is challenged not just by religious
philosophers but by secular ones like myself who find the idealized concep-
tion of mind and voluntarism presupposed in their guidance a legacy of
internalism’s truck with philosophical rationalism. Carter claims that the
Thanks again to an anonymous Referee for suggesting this last response to the evidentialist
and proponent of UT.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. For a sharp rebuttal of evidentialism
based on its ill-fit with the manner in which temperament deeply affects many beliefs associated
with personal identity, see Kidd, .
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epistemological significance of disagreement is such that “we are rationally
obligated to withhold judgment about a large portion of our beliefs in
controversial subject areas, such as philosophy, religion, morality, and poli-
tics”. While he recognizes that a thorough-going agnostic suspension might
be charged with “spinelessness”, and impracticability— the un-liveability
objection— he qualifies Feldman and Conee’s evidentialism to acknowledge
these concerns. Carter qualifies Feldman’s “tacit commitment to the Triad
View, with its deontological categories of belief, suspension of belief, and
disbelief”, by arguing that it “has the effect of artificially restricting the
range of reasonable attitudes we might take up in controversial areas…” ().
The abandonment of this commitment opens up other possible sub-dox-
astic attitudes besides “suspension”. Carter expands the connotation of
“agnosticism” to include the sub-doxastic attitude of “suspecting that”. By
then introducing a right to “suspecting that” but not “believing that”, when
conditions are right, Carter thinks he held onto the guiding principle of
conformism while rendering it more “livable”. But the account remains
impermissivist: there is still assumed a single right response to revealed
peer disagreement among controversial views: agnosticism. The princi-
pled agnostic’s categories of doxastic attitudes are still essentially treated
deontologically since they line up with epistemic duties or entitlements.
These are things denied by permissivists, who tend to favor assertability
rather than propositionally-focused treatments of well-founded belief, or
treatments which cohere better with the ecological rationality of agents,
and the mixed valuative / epistemic character of controversial views. I argue
that the what an inductive risk approach brings to the table to distin-
guish motivated from unmotivated etiological challenges, also shows how
overgeneralized are the prescriptions that conformists and steadfasters
each take to be the normative upshot of genuine peer disagreement. They
accord well also with Susan Haack’s work of the ethics of belief developing
the advantages of an “Overlap” model according to which there is, not
an invariable correlation, but partial overlap, where positive / negative
epistemic appraisal is associated with positive / negative ethical appraisals
(). Haack’s model allows her to identify the scope and proper limits
of such doxastic responsibility by (a) restricting the domain in which in-
stances of believing may be judged on ethical as well as epistemic grounds;
by (b) distinguishing role-specific responsibilities from those that are more
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generally appropriate; and by (c) identifying circumstances that serve to
exonerate individuals from unfortunate epistemic failures .
In this connection we might pause to note that there are some inter-
pretations of Clifford’s thought which puts him on the side of the Mil-
lian-Jamesian emphasis on character types, instead of opposed to it. This
opens paths for mediation between Clifford and James, and more generally
between impermissivism and permissivism in the ethics of belief. Niko-
laj Nottelmann and Patrick Fessenbecker () argue that “in Clifford’s
eyes the shipowner’s relevant failure is not so much volitional as charac-
terological” (Nottelmann & Fessenbecker, : ). Darwin was a strong
influence for Clifford, and if we pay attention to his “implicit Darwinism”
we find a considerably less voluntaristic Clifford than the shipowner case
is usually taken to present. These authors, like myself, greatly prefer the
Clifford who invite attribution theory, the Clifford who wrote that an
agent’s “mental character” determines his course of action, something that
only requires “conscious consultation of [one’s] past history”. Whether of
Clifford himself or of the ethics of belief debate, I would certainly endorse
the author’s proposal to dismiss the volitionist interpretation associated
with the shipowner case, “replacing it with an attributionist interpretation
more naturally covering his full range of salient cases”.
We have explained why there is a need for a more principled and
fine-grained application of bias studies to well-motivated etiological chal-
lenges. But what, more specifically, has inductive risk got to do with this?
How do inductive norms and the study of the epistemic risk entailed by
their violation help us to motivate the censure of an agent as unreasonable?
We can now turn to these questions more directly.
I here paraphrase R.A. Christian’s (Christian, : –) useful elaboration of Haack,
.
Clifford, The Ethics of Belief, , as discussed in Nottelmann & Fessenbecker, .
ibid.. These authors’ ability to utilize Haack’s mediating approach to the ethics of belief
is most amenable conciliation. I argue that her “overlap” model offers the best account of the
relationship between moral and epistemic concerns. I still see Clifford’s “sole and supreme
allegiance of conscience to the community” as unhelpful, a kind of social duty so strong as
to be a kind of dulce et decorum est. While no moral duty could be as strong as Clifford, or
the equal-weight view, or principled agnosticism demands, the moral approach to evidentialist
constraints I do hold as far superior to that of Feldman and Conee’s epistemological account,
which purposely eschews moral evidentialism.
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. VIOLATIONS OF INDUCTIVE NORMS AS PROPER GROUNDS OF CENSURE
The project of guidance, we have said, is a quite different project than
analysis of knowledge and shouldn’t be confused with it. But guidance
clearly does connect with censure, and when it does, its force is in the
direction of humility or increased deference to higher-order evidence. But
this can manifest in different ways, not just synchronically in a lowered
degree of credence or a shift from belief to suspension of belief. It can
manifest diachronically in habituating oneself to general virtues of doxastic
responsibility, and in revising commitments so as to minimize or eliminate
the manners in which one’s faith ventures put other people at moral risk.
These different ways of responding to strong etiological challenges to our
beliefs are not incommensurable. Either is better than the “method of
tenacity” and the “method of authority” that C. S. Peirce found so prevalent
in our all-too-human ways of settling belief. But given how unsettling
the preference of many philosophers for principled agnosticism may be
for testimonial faith traditions, and the important positive connections
between risk-taking and identity, permissivists should likely set themselves
apart by allowing for guidance that make demands less drastic, and more
focused on forward-looking inquiry. We have to start with where we are
and learn to recognize and resist biases; no one can simply put them aside
and then recalculate the weight of evidence as an ideal agent for whom the
temporal order of an agent’s coming to hold evidence bearing on a belief is
completely discounted. Nothing could be further from the psychological
truth for human beings, whose “nurtured” beliefs coming to them from an
early age and make up a large part of their developing identity.
Belief revision and responses to higher-order evidence are perhaps the
more direct focus of the ethics of belief than belief acquisition, at least
where agents appear to have more control over revising their beliefs than
over how they originally come to hold them. This seems to be the case
with culturally nurtured beliefs in particular. That we hold a belief seems
often as something we can’t help doing, and James affirms this through
the often-unconscious influence of our willing nature. Cooler reflection and
revision often only comes later, and philosophers such as Socrates and
Descartes and many others bid us at least once in life to take an inventory
Evidentialism and its thesis O2 are committed to the Principle of Commutativity, where
the order of the acquisition of evidence should be irrelevant to its weight in a person’s
deliberations. For a discussion of the commutativity principle, see Georgi Gardner (Gardiner,
).
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of the beliefs we acquired at an earlier age, and then methodically to
decide which of these are worth continuing to hold, and why. What James
affirms of theistic belief’s origins for most people in “Reflex Action and
Theism” are elaborated in the class notes of a noted student of James,
W.E.B. Du Bois: “Man spontaneously believes and spontaneously acts.
But as acts and beliefs multiply, they grow inconsistent. To escape bellum
omnium contra omnes, reasonable principles, fit for all to agree upon, must
be sought”. As we have seen, a broad way to describe the substance of
the reasonable principles James says are needed is in connection with the
Rawlsian “burdens of judgment” that undergird what he terms reasonable
pluralism. But a more specific way to describe them is as principles that
support inductive norms and at the same time censure counter-inductive
thinking, or the self-exemption of oneself or ingroup from attributions one
applies to others. We turn to this directly in the final section.
. INDUCTIVE RISK AND ITS MANY MARKERS
To begin, let me offer definitions for some terms which are central to the
account. Then we can describe how they differently inform epistemology
and the ethics of belief.
 Inductive risk: the risk of “getting it wrong” in an inductive context
of inquiry.
 Inductive context of inquiry: any context of inquiry dependent upon
reasoning by analogy, generalization or applied generalization, or
cause-and-effect.
 Counter-inductive thinking: counter-induction is a strategy that
whether self-consciously or not reverses the normal logic of induc-
tion. As such it should be distinguished from merely weak inductive
reasoning and seen instead as thinking or belief uptake that carry
especially high inductive risk.
 Aetiological symmetries: naturalistically salient factors in belief-forma-
tion that are similar for people across time and culture; for example,
the “proximate” causes of early childhood education are often salient
in development of a religious identity / affiliation irrespective of the
particular religion or sect.
I have been unable to track reference for this quotation, but thank an anonymous reviewer
for suggesting the relevance of this passage to my own argument that to locate and articulate
such common, reasonable principles, we should go beyond Rawls’ “burdens” to markers of
inductive riskiness in the etiology of belief or the rhetorical defense of held beliefs.
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 Bias mirroring: the agent ascribes praise or blame, virtue or vice,
etc. to others in ways that “mirror” known personal biases such
as confirmation bias, or known social, us-them biases. That these
ascriptions find support in the scripture, tradition, or other perceived
religious authority are set aside in order to focus on the formal
features of the agent’s manner of making attributions about persons.
When we attribute traits to others, the attributions we make depend
upon the drawing and applying of generalizations, the drawing of analo-
gies and disanalogies, and the drawing of causes from perceived effects,
and predicted outcomes or consequences from perceived causes. When
trait-attributions are given theological backing, the emphasis is typically
on the uniqueness of the “true” religion vis-à-vis all the remaining religions.
From an epistemological perspective, however, the relevance of proximate,
naturalistically-accessible causes of belief, such as early childhood exposure
to and submersion in one particular faith tradition (typically that of one’s
family or broader culture) cannot be easily dismissed in favor of theological,
“final cause” explanations for having come into just the beliefs that one
has. A strong “etiological challenge” to the well-foundedness of belief does
not come merely from the belief’s apparent contingency upon the agent’s
epistemic location (i. e., their family, culture, or time in history). On the
present account, etiological challenges gain strength from particular mark-
ers of inductive riskiness. Many of these markers focus on the individual,
but some draw attention to how strongly fideistic is the model of faith
which the agent is appropriating in their way of dealing with evidence, and
with the broader relationship between reason and faith.
The inductive risk account tells us that additional markers of risk beyond
the contingency of beliefs on the agent’s epistemic location will motivate
a stronger etiological challenge. Clifford and James both seem to have rec-
ognized that when matters are deeply underdetermined by evidence, one’s
coming to belief is typically overdetermined by trait-dependent factors.
They differed mainly in their assessment of the “right” to such tempera-
mentally-guided beliefs. While attribution theory in psychology meshes
well with these points that Clifford and James share, contemporary epis-
temology of disagreement and contemporary epistemology of testimony
seem to me to ignore the study of trait-dependent belief in favor of some
“universal” prescription, whether conformist or steadfast.
By contrast, the inductive risk account rejects overgeneralized guidance,
formulated these “oughts” and “ought nots” only for individuals and on the
basis of finding evidence of trait-dependent factors in the etiology of belief,
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evidence of rhetorical as opposed to robust (well-motivated) vice-charging,
etc. Attribution theory makes central the connections between chronic
evidential underdetermination in domains of controversial views and the
trait-dependent overdetermination of belief in adopted faith ventures. The
study of trait-dependence is vital to the epistemology of controversial
views, since it appears to be indicative of the overdetermination of belief
by temperamental factors. Pairing underdetermination concerns with the
empirically-informed study of the marks of temperamentally “overdeter-
mined” judgments on the parts of agents, puts us in better stead. This
pairing allows us to see that where there is etiological symmetry (meaning
that people acquire their beliefs in much the same way similar strategies
or environmental factors functioning as proximate causes of belief), yet
substantial contrariety or disagreement in the content of these agents’
beliefs, etiological challenges to their well-foundedness gain in strength.
Relatedly, the inductive risk account does a good job of explaining how
and why self-same doxastic strategies (etiological symmetries) predictably
give rise to contrary belief systems in testimonial faith traditions. This
I term symmetrical contrariety, using the polarized and polemical apolo-
getics of religious fundamentalists as the prime example and target of my
normative critique. But more generally, the inductive risk account works
like this: The reliable etiology of belief is shown especially suspect and
the agents open to censure (both normative claims) when the belief can
be shown descriptively (a) to result from counter-inductive thinking on
the part of the agent (the agent makes their own case an exemption from
a pattern recognized as applying to others), and (b) to mirror the kinds
of judgments that biased individuals would make.
Problems of Religious Luck (Axtell, ) develops specific, an inductive
risk-based challenge to the reasonableness of religious exclusivist (a) con-
ceptions of faith and (b) responses to religious multiplicity. The adherent
of exclusivist religious faith, I argue, suspends inductive norms, or norms
that govern strong and cogent analogical reasoning, cause-effect reasoning,
or generalization / applied generalization. The moral and epistemic risk of
suspending inductive norms as tied to exclusivist responses to religious mul-
tiplicity, and to asymmetric religious trait-attributions between religious
insiders and outsiders.
This specific criticism need not be repeated here, but the riskiness of as-
cribing traits to group insiders and outsiders in sharply asymmetric fashion
On distinguishing robust from rhetorical vice-charging, see Kidd, .
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can be brought into view by several thought experiments developed in the
book. First, though, the skeptical force of inductive risk is compounded
when, remaining neutral to the agent’s high theological explanation for
the difference in truth-status, we find that the proximate causes of belief
are actually pretty symmetrical in the case of the home religion affirmed
as true and the alien religions treated as false. That God “made it so”
that the attributed asymmetries obtain between in-group and outgroup,
as a faith-based assumption, is now directly confronted by markers of
bias and inductive risk.
In order to make the confrontation of fideistic faith with the evidence of
social psychology and inductive norms more salient for individuals, I develop
a number of thought experiments. In religious belief uptake, counter-in-
ductive thinking is often the result of: (a) Self / ingroup assumption that
“the pattern stops here” in their own case, and thus of exceptionalism with
regard to the truth or religious value of the home religion; or (b) implicit
rejection of any inductive pattern or etiological symmetries between pro-
ponents of testimonial faith traditions one needs to take account of. So,
the thought experiments are ones that prime things like bias mirroring,
or contingency anxiety. What would a person given to my-side bias, or
us-them bias, judge, and how different is this from the religious differences
you are attributing? What would you believe about the religious system
of belief you have, if you were born into a different religious community?
In thought experiments, such as these the respondent may find cause to
take disagreement more seriously than they previously had, leading to
greater intellectual humility and open-mindedness about religious aliens.
Even if not, the focus on inductive risk leads into a dilemma that forces
one of two responses that can then be pursued in dialogue: The response
that aapparent aetiological symmetries between home and alien religious
systems of belief are genuine but unimportant; and the response that one’s
own beliefs were acquired by an altogether unique process, so that the
purported etiological symmetries are misleading / false. Neither response
is likely to prove very successful; the reasons for this should be apparent:
both involve the agent only in further fideistic circularity. The suspension
of inductive norms is made apparent in such thought experiments, and the
violation of norms has a strong connection to criticism. A tight connection
between norm violation and the appropriateness of censure indeed seems
apparent in all normative practices. A tight connection between norm vio-
lation and the appropriateness of censure (criticism) indeed seems apparent
in all normative practices. Still, as permissivists who grant others a good
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deal of “epistemic slack”, we should be careful about the sense or senses
of responsibility we attribute to agents. And we should try to be clear to
distinguish the kind of criticism and censure that inductively-risky belief
invite, and “blame” in some sense moral or epistemic. Many of the more
contentious claims over the epistemic irrationality which follows from the
“prescribed certainty” of fideistic belief may by this latter distinction be
put aside. Still, as permissivists who grant our peers a decent amount of
“epistemic slack”, especially as this is in respect to faith ventures which they
consider valuable for their personal perfection. We let them be choosers
of the risk insofar as it is free from hermeneutic or epistemic injustice.
This reflects common ground between “friendly” theists and atheists who
can each agree with Jefferson (himself echoing the early Church father
Tertullian) that “But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there
are twenty gods or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg”.
Of course, mirroring personal or social biases, committing rhetorical
fallacies, “disowning” beliefs which have no different proximate causes than
contrary beliefs one’s peers, unsafe and / or insensitive belief in the sense
in which they are discussed in epistemology, rhetorical vice charging, and
asymmetric moral or religious trait ascriptions lacking principled support,
are always grounds for censure. Inductive risk account doesn’t cut it slack
there; it doesn’t exempt unsafe and / or insensitive beliefs from criticism.
Rather, not all rational criticism or censure is “blame”. The point is that
we should be careful about the specific sense or senses of responsibility
we attribute to agents, and the different kinds of censure that might go
with each. The modal insensitivity of many of our controversial views
is a challenge to all of us, not some of us, and if the dialogue between
theologians, philosophers, and psychologists is to find common ground in
the study of inductive risk, all parties must agree that inductively risky
belief invites scrutiny, since it is always directly relevant to what makes for
genuinely strong etiological challenges. But this sense of censure has more
to do with assessment of the state or standing of an agent’s belief.
The position I have sketched out in this paper still seems neutral to many
debates on blame and blameworthiness. Many of the more contentious
claims of “epistemic irrationality” are made against adherents of conceptions
of religious faith which identify faith with “evidentially underdetermined
historicity” of Biblical miracles, and with “prescribed certainty” in these
or other tenets of a creed. Certainly, I find such a conception of faith
epistemologically paradoxical. But I am with Kierkegaard, James, and
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many others who would highlight the existential risks we all take in do-
mains of controversial views. I do not set “religion” or religious assertion
apart but only seek to understand why and how strong fideism plies on
counter-inductive thinking, and how violation of inductive norms relates
to assessment on the one hand, and guidance on the other.
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ИНДУКТИВНОЕ ИСЧИСЛЕНИЕ РИСКОВ
В ЭТИКЕ УБЕЖДЕНИЯ
Аннотация: Из каких норм этика веры выводит ее добродетели и пороки, дозволения
и запреты? Поскольку прагматисты понимают эпистемологию как теорию исследования,
в статье будет предпринята попытка объяснить, каковы цели и задачи этики убеждения,
или т. н. «руководства», которое наилучшим образом соответствует этому пониманию
эпистемологии. Я подкреплю этот тезис ссылками на работы Уильяма Джеймса и неко-
торых современных прагматистов. В данной статье этика убеждения рассматривается
в контексте ответственности управления рисками, где под доксастической ответствен-
ностью понимается степень рискованности доксастических стратегий агентов, которая,
в свою очередь, наиболее объективно измеряется через соблюдение или несоблюдение
индуктивных норм. Доксастическая ответственность приписывается агентам на основе
того, насколько эпистемически рискованным был процесс или стратегии исследования,
существенные этиологии их убеждений или поддержания уже имеющихся. Рассмотре-
ние «доксастических стратегий» индивидуальных и коллективных агентов в качестве
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центральных для проектов эпистемической оценки приводит к совершенно иному их
объяснению, чем и стандартный эпистемологический ацент на «процессе» объективно
достоверной этиологии веры, и стандартный эвиденциалистский акцент на рефлексивно
доступных «причинах» действия агента, дающих ему определенный тип обоснования
его убеждения, личный / субъективный.
Ключевые слова: У. Джеймс, этика убеждения, эпистемология несогласия, индуктив-
ный риск, эпистемология риска, вседозволенность.
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